York is still a different city—not Chicago, not Detroit, not Los Angeles. And, undoubtedly, part of what makes New York a different city are traditions arising from its ethnic variety. New York has had more experience than most American cities in living with a large variety of ethnic groups and in seeing their position and power wax and wane. Perhaps most significantly, this ethnic variety is marked by the presence, as still the largest ethnic group, of the traditionally pacific and nonviolent Jews. Despite the example of Israel, New York City Jews are still strangers to arms—or hunting or target practice or the other recreational and cultural pursuits that encourage acquaintance with arms. They have never been workers in heavy industry, which encourages brawn and provides an environment in which violence is more easily accepted. They are in light industry, in commerce, and in the professions, and come out of cultural environments in which violence is limited to language. Even when they are criminals, they tend to make illegal use of brains, not brawn.

Further, no group in New York City is accustomed to domination, though each may have a partial dominance in some area, and no group, therefore, finds challenge unexpected or outrageous. The Irish have withdrawn before the pressure of Italians and Jews; the white Protestants have been a minority for more than a century, and in recent generations a small minority; Italians, despite their huge number as the second largest white group, have always been concentrated in fairly humble occupations; Jews, despite their recent prominence, remember anti-Semitism and the need for prudence and caution. There is a basic reservoir of good feeling in the city that permits accommodation, change, the rise of new groups to new positions of political power and economic well-being. Obviously, saying this, we present a hypothesis but a hypothesis that we must believe in generally, throughout the country, if the nation is to survive without racial warfare. In New York, at any rate, we have more grounds for believing it than elsewhere.

But if this reservoir is to be built on, if New York is to continue to survive as a city with some degree of harmony and accommodation, then there must be wider understanding of the state of race and ethnic relations in the city.

**A Resurgence of Ethnicity?**

The over-all ethnic pattern of the city has not changed since 1960, though the proportions have. There are still six major, fairly well-defined groups. The most visible is the Negro, which is rapidly increasing its proportion of the city's population, and has risen from 14 per cent in 1960 to an estimated 20 per cent today. The second most visible and sharply defined group is the Puerto Rican, whose proportion within the city population has increased since 1960 from 8 to 11 per cent. Substantial numbers of Latin Americans—Cubans and others—have come into the city since 1960 and tend to be lumped in public identification with Puerto Ricans, though they resist this. The largest single ethnic group in the city is the Jewish. Our data on their numbers are very poor. We guess they are declining from the quarter of the city's population they have long formed, to more like a fifth, but they are still probably more numerous than the Negroes. The next largest white group is the Italian. The Italian-born and their children alone formed 11 per cent of the city's population in 1960, leaving out the entire third generation and beyond. Perhaps they form one-seventh of the city's population. The Irish are a steadily declining part of the city's population, owing to heavy movements to the suburbs (also true, but in lesser degree, of Jews and Italians). They form probably some 7 per cent of the city.13

White Anglo-Saxon Protestants form the sixth most important social segment of the city in ethnic terms. If Irish identity becomes questionable in the later generations, WASP identity is even less of a tangible and specific identity. It is a created identity, and largely forged in New York City in order to identify those who are not otherwise ethnically identified and who, while a small minority in the city, represent what is felt to be the "majority" for the rest of the country.

Even in New York they bear the prestige of representing the "majority," whatever that may be, and, more significantly, they dominate the large banks, the large insurance companies, the large corporations that make their
headquarters in the city. Young people flock to the city to work in its communications industries, advertising agencies, in the corporate office buildings, and discover they have become WASPs. This odd term includes descendants of early Dutch settlers (there are still a few), of early English and Scottish settlers (there are still some of these, too), immigrants and descendants of immigrants to the city from Great Britain, and migrants to the city from parts of the country which have had substantial proportions of settlers of British, English-speaking background. Merged into this mix may be persons of German background who no longer feel ethnically identified as German-Americans. The Germans, who formed along with the Irish the dominant ethnic group of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in the city, have not maintained, as a group, a prominence in the city proportionate to their numbers. (And yet in the 1960's the Steuben Day parade became a major event, at which the attendance of city officeholders was obligatory.)

Beyond the six major defined segments that are crucial to politics, to self-awareness, and also to the social description of the city, there are numerous others, but they tend to have a more local significance. In any given area, one must be aware of Poles, Russians, Greeks, Armenians, Chinese, Cubans, Norwegians, Swedes, Hungarians, Czechs, and so on, and so on, but even the largest of these groups forms no more than a few per cent of the city's population.

The Chinese community has grown, owing to the revision of the immigration laws in 1965, which eliminated the last references to race and national origin. The Cuban community is the largest new addition to the city's ethnic array. The over-all pattern, however, remains the familiar one of the early 1960's, with the trends then noted continuing: the growth of the Negro and Puerto Rican populations; the decline of the older ethnic groups, Irish and German; the continued significance of the two major groups of the "new immigration" of 1880 to 1924, the Jews and the Italians. This is the statistical pattern. Politically, economically, and culturally, however, two groups have outdistanced all others in the sixties: Jews and White Anglo-Saxon Protestants. The life of the city in the late sixties reflected nothing so much as an alliance between these groups, or parts of them, and the growing Negro group, against the remaining white, largely Catholic, groups. We shall say more later concerning why this has come about and what it means for the city.

Have ethnic identity and the significance of ethnic identity declined in the city since the early 1960's? The long-expected and predicted decline of ethnicity, the fuller acculturation and the assimilation of the white ethnic groups, seems once again delayed—as it was by World War I, World War II, and the cold war—and by now one suspects, if something expected keeps on failing to happen, that there may be more reasons than accident that explain why ethnicity and ethnic identity continue to persist. In Beyond the Melting Pot, we suggested that ethnic groups, owing to their distinctive historical experiences, their cultures and skills, the times of their arrival and the economic situation they met, developed distinctive economic, political, and cultural patterns. As the old culture fell away—and it did rapidly enough—a new one, shaped by the distinctive experiences of life in America, was formed and a new identity was created. Italian-Americans might share precious little with Italians in Italy, but in America they were a distinctive group that maintained itself, was identifiable, and gave something to those who were identified with it, just as it also gave burdens that those in the group had to bear.

 Beyond the accidents of history, one suspects, is the reality that human groups endure, that they provide some satisfaction to their members, and that the adoption of a totally new ethnic identity, by dropping whatever one is to become simply American, is inhibited by strong elements in the social structure of the United States. It is inhibited by a subtle system of identifying, which ranges from brutal discrimination and prejudice to merely naming. It is inhibited by the unavailability of a simple "American" identity. One is a New Englander, or a Southerner, or a Midwesterner, and all these things mean something too concrete for the ethnic to adopt completely, while excluding his ethnic identity.

In any case, whatever the underlying fault lines in American society that seem to maintain or permit
the maintenance of ethnic identity beyond the point of cultural assimilation, the fact is ethnic identity continued in the sixties.

We have precious few studies of ethnic identity, despite the increasing prominence of its role in the mass media in recent years, and we speak consequently quite hypothetically. Yet we would like to suggest three hypotheses on the changing position of ethnic identity in recent years.

First: ethnic identities have taken over some of the task in self-definition and in definition by others that occupational identities, particularly working-class occupational identities, have generally played. The status of the worker has been downgraded; as a result, apparently, the status of being an ethnic, a member of an ethnic group, has been upgraded.

There is no question that many occupational identities have lost a good deal of their merit and virtue, not to say glamour, in the eyes of those who hold them, and in the eyes of those in positions of significance in communications and the mass media who do so much to dispense ideas of merit, virtue, and glamour. The unions, the organizations of the working class, have certainly lost much of their glamour. What young bright man coming out of college would think that the most attractive, personally satisfying, and useful job he could hold would be to work for a union, as the authors did in 1944? Indeed, the intelligentsia has been quietly departing from unions and moving into government and the universities for ten years and more. But more significant has been the downgrading of working-class occupations. In the depression, in World War II, even after the war, the worker held an honored and important position. Radicals fought over his allegiance, the Democratic party was happy in his support, one could even see workers portrayed in the movies by men such as Humphrey Bogart, John Garfield, Clark Gable, and these heroes portrayed occupations, whether as truck drivers or oilfield workers or even produce marketmen, that had some reputation and value.

Similarly, to be a homeowner after the war, and many workers became homeowners, was meritorious. It indicated rise in status, setting down roots, becoming a part of the community. Today, if one were to test associations to the word "worker" and "homeowner" among television newscasters and young college graduates, one is afraid one of the chief associations would be "racist" and "Wallaceite." It is hard to recall any movie of the late sixties, aside from *Pretty Poison*, in which a factory worker was a leading character, and in *Pretty Poison* the factory spewed chemical filth into the countryside, and the worker himself was half mad.\footnote{14}

Lower-middle-class statuses have also suffered, but the clerk or teacher or salesman never did do well in the mass media. The worker did; he formed part of that long-sustained and peculiar alliance that has always seemed to link those of higher status, in particular aristocrats and intellectuals, with lower-class people, leaving the middle classes in the middle to suffer the disdain of both. What has happened in recent years is that the lower pole of the alliance has shifted downward, leaving out the working class, and now hooking up the intellectuals and the upper-middle-class youth with the Negro lower class.

The Wallace movement and the Procaccino campaign were in part efforts to take political advantage of the declining sense of being valued in the working- and lower-middle class, and to ascribe to these groups a greater measure of credit and respect, as against both the more prosperous and better educated, who have supported measures designed to assist Negroes and the poor, and the Negroes and the poor themselves. If these class and occupational statuses have been downgraded, by that token alone ethnic identity seems somewhat more desirable. Today, it may be better to be an Italian than a worker. Twenty years ago, it was the other way around.

Thus, one reason we would suggest for the maintenance of ethnic identities is the fact that working-class identities and perhaps some other occupational identities have lost status and respect.

Let us suggest a second hypothesis as to changes in ethnic identity in this decade: international events have declined as a source of feelings of ethnic identity, except for Jews; domestic events have become more im-
portant: The rise of Hitler and World War II led to an enormous rise in feelings of ethnic identification. Nor was there much decline after the war, as the descendants of East European immigrants who had been aroused by Hitler's conquests now saw their homelands become Russian satellites, and as other nations were threatened. But aside from Jews, no group now sees its homeland in danger. (Israel barely qualifies as a "homeland," but the emotional identification is the same.) Even the resurgence of conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland has evoked only a sluggish response among American Irish. By this very token, as involvement with and concern for the homelands decline, the sources of ethnic identification more and more are to be found in American experiences, on American soil. This is not to say that identification with homelands in danger or in conflict cannot rise again. But for the first time a wave of ethnic feeling in this country has been evoked not primarily by foreign affairs but by domestic developments. This is a striking and important development—it attests to the long-lived character of ethnic identification and raises the curtain somewhat on the future history of ethnic identity in this country.

A third hypothesis: along with occupation and homeland, religion has declined as a focus of ethnic identification. Just as ethnicity and occupation overlap, so do ethnicity and religion. For some time, it seemed as if new identities based on religion were taking over from ethnic identities. This was the hypothesis of Will Herberg. The Jews remixed Jews, with a subtle shift from an ethnic identification in the first and second generation to more of a religious identification in the third; the Irish became ever more Catholic in their self-image, and so did the Italians. Even the P in WASP stands for Protestant, as part of the identity. Only for Negroes did racial identity seem clearly far more significant than religion. In Beyond the Melting Pot, we argued that religion and race seemed to be taking over from ethnic identity. Yet in the last few years, the role of religion as a primary identity for Americans has weakened. Partly, in the case of Catholics, confusion and uncertainty have entered what was only a few years ago a very firm and clear identity. Thus, for Irish and Italians alike,

Catholicism once confirmed a basic conservatism; it was not only anti-Communist, obviously, but, more significantly, it took conservative positions on issues of family, sex, culture, education. Catholics formed the core of the Democratic party in New York, which, alongside its pronounced and decisive liberalism in social policy, remained conservative on issues of family and culture. The revolution in the Catholic Church has shaken this monolithic institution, and the identity of Catholic is no longer self-evident, to those holding it or to those outside the Church. The change is symbolized by the radical changes in ritual, in this most conservative of institutions, and in the possibility of changes in such ancient patterns as the celibacy of the clergy.

For the purposes of race relations, most striking development is the divergence between clergy and laity (some clergy and some laity) on the issue of Negro militancy. When priests marched with Martin Luther King in Chicago, it was reported that Catholic workers who opposed the move of Negroes into their neighborhoods said, "Now even they are with them, and we are alone." Nothing as striking as this has happened in New York, where the laity are not as conservative as in Chicago (with its strong Polish and Lithuanian representation), and where the priests have not come up with a prominent radical leader. But if there is no equivalent of Father Groppi in New York, there are many smaller versions of Father Groppi. Catholicism no longer conforms as fully as it did some years ago to the conservative tendencies of Italians and Irish.

We have suggested three aspects of the current prominence of ethnicity: that it is related to the declining merit of certain occupational identifications, that it increasingly finds its sources in domestic rather than foreign crises, and that the revolution in the Catholic Church means that, for the first time, it does not complement the conservative tendencies of Catholic ethnic groups. Now we come to a fourth aspect. In a word, is the resurgence of ethnicity simply a matter of the resurgence of racism, as is now often asserted? Is the reaction of whites, of ethnic groups and the working and middle class, to the increasingly militant demands of Negroes a matter of defense of ethnic and occupational turfs and privileges or is it a matter of racial an-
maintaining a distinct identity, albeit a changing one, from one generation to the next. One group is not as another and, notably where religious and cultural values are involved, these differences are matters of choice as well as of heritage; of new creation in a new country, as well as of the maintenance of old values and forms. Our discussion of these differences necessarily touches, even dwells, on the consequent, widely varying patterns of achievement in areas such as education, business, and politics. Understandably enough, the unevenness of achievement in such matters is the source of resentment and even bitterness by many individual members of the different groups. It may be that our discussion will also be resented by such persons, for much the same reason. We would therefore, in advance, ask a measure of forgiveness for taking up a subject which needs to be discussed, but which cannot be aired without giving pain to some.

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This work was conceived and organized by Nathan Glazer. He wrote "the Negroes," "the Puerto Ricans," "the Jews," "the Italians," and most of the "Introduction." Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote "the Irish" and most of the last chapter, "Beyond the Melting Pot." We have discussed and criticized each other's writing, and worked together to formulate the thesis that the book presents.

Washington
April, 1963
Nathan Glazer
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Introduction

In 1660 William Kieft, the Dutch governor of New Netherland, remarked to the French Jesuit Isaac Jogues that there were eighteen languages spoken at or near Fort Amsterdam at the tip of Manhattan Island. There still are: not necessarily the same languages, but at least as many; nor has the number ever declined in the intervening three centuries. This is an essential fact of New York: a merchant metropolis with an extraordinarily heterogeneous population. The first shipload of settlers sent out by the Dutch was made up largely of French-speaking Protestants, British, Germans, Finns, Jews, Swedes, Africans, Italians, Irish followed, beginning a stream that has never yet stopped.

The consequences of this confusion, soon to be compounded by the enormous size of the city itself, have been many. Not least has been the virtual impossibility ever of describing New York City or even the state in simple