It was interesting to see the continuity between chapter 6 of Larson’s book and Stein’s article “De Blasio’s Doomed Housing Plan”. The chapter essentially outlined how the former mayor Bloomberg approached the topic of urban development that stemmed from the RPA’s Third Regional Plan advocating investment in “Economy, Equity and Environment” and the city’s role as a global capital (Larson, 2013) As reiterated many times in the chapter, Bloomberg’s urban renewal agenda featured a blend of modernist concepts advocating rapid and aggressive urban growth complemented by “incentives, tax subsidies and blurring of public and private monies. . .” and traditional ideas that championed healthy, multifaceted neighborhoods and voiced Jane Jacob’s call for diversifying and enhancing the use of “underutilized” land for the working-class (Larson 2013). The chapter further explains how zoning was the impetus of urban development during the early 2000s, which not only attracted prospective private investors but also had elements from both ends of the urban planning spectrum. In other words, zoning during the Bloomberg administration was both large-scaled and diversified. It was interesting to note the political influence that zoning had in the city, where most of the downzoning was taking place in primarily white regions that voted heavily for Bloomberg and weren’t fond of high-density apartments. Also, i didn’t realize that one of the examples of diversified zoning in the chapter (Jamaica, Queens and the Airtrain) is actually where my father’s business is located. Whenever i work there, it is interesting to see how the local residents react when they find out that the tourist-oriented Airtrain costs $5 (via Metrocard) to go to JFK even though the subway and buses below are half the price.
The last part of the chapter is basically a juxtaposition of Stein’s article relating to inclusionary zoning. Even though inclusionary zoning was a part of Bloomberg’s agenda, with expectations of producing roughly 40,000 affordable housing units and financing another 82,000, it was merely voluntary and provided density bonuses for developers who accommodated some affordable housing. Moreover, Larson mentions that this method rendered it vulnerable to any economic recessions that largely dictated the investment of both the city and private developers. Ultimately the voluntary zoning accounted” for just 1.7% of housing growth between 2005 and 2015″ (Stein,2014) . It is no wonder that the “need to force developers to build less expensively” proposed in Larson’s chapter is what De Blasio currently has in mind (Larson, 2013). Yet as the title of Stein’s article suggests, the mayor’s double -down tactics have some inevitable shortcomings . Central to the argument (and something vital to our project) is that even though apartments built by private investors may ultimately accommodate affordable housing units, its application will not only cause rent to rise in the surrounding area due to the influx of wealthier families, but also compel landlords of many existing affordable housing units to sell their properties to such developers. Through the perspective of our project, the article also mentions some realities of the affordable housing dilemma. Simply put, the concept is a contradiction and that “There are ways to do it well, but they are not profitable.” (Stein, 2014); revealing how the topic is more complicated than it seems.
Discussion Question: Even though the method didn’t work in San Francisco, could the application of inclusionary zoning over the entire city work in NYC?
References
Larson, S. (2013). Building like Moses with Jacobs in Mind, ( 5 and Ch. 6)
Stein, S. (2014) DeBlasio’s Doomed Housing Plan, in
