Up until now, we have defined citizenship solely as a matter of legality. While describing civilian crime prevention on the Lower East Side, Jessica R. Cattelino expands this definition by highlighting the moral and performative aspects of one’s membership in a society. It becomes quite clear then that “citizenship” is not confined to a mere document, but is rather subjective.

So what exactly does it mean to be a citizen? According to some civilian crime-prevention participants, to be a good citizen is to be an active participant in the community. To them, “citizenship” is synonymous with “involvement” and the upholding of moral duties and civic responsibilities. In this sense, civilian crime fighting can be considered an American ideal. Poorer participants of color, however, characterize citizenship as a matter of exercising and asserting rights, specifically the right to protection. To them, civilian crime fighting is not so much an ideal as it is a necessary evil in a society where there exists unjust police neglect.

With that said, it seems as though it is quite difficult to reach a universal understanding of citizenship. Even so, is it not possible for multiple interpretations to coexist at once? Whether these participants function as “active” or “passive” citizens, are they not all united under shared social and political actions aimed at crime prevention? Despite their common goals, however, there exists a tension between these two groups. And while this tension is exacerbated by unequal allocations of resources (among other causes of friction), the core of this difference lies, in actuality, in the concept of citizenship, as it is distinctly – and strictly – defined. As Cattelino concludes, the emphasis on participation widens the gap between those who “partake of the moral good of active citizenship” and those who are viewed as “merely (and immorally) taking from the state,” a gap that is formed in the name of citizenship.