Yesterday, we looked at Chinatown as a possible opportunity for Americans to experience an authentic Chinese enclave. To support this, Kwong further describes in Chapters 5-6 how Chinatown remained an independent entity within New York City, with its own economy, politics, social services, language and cultural norms. However, the authenticity is a slightly falsified one as it appears to Americans; although Chinatown remained independent, American tourists aren’t fully privy to the realities of the norms of the place. The economy was the basis for the structure of the community and therefore corruption and manipulative leaders rose to control and represent the politics through their economic power and influence. However, Kwong notes that one of the main bodies of leadership, the CCBA “is clearly not representative of the community, nor is it a mediating force among associations” of the citizens (92). As we have discussed in class, Chinatown was ruled by capitalistic endeavors and the people in control did not reflect the nature or lifestyle of the masses. These ruling elite were “indifferent to the problems of the poor,” and “promote[d] … ethnic solidarity” in the community, although the reality was that the people were anything but unified (94). They censored publications, monopolized industry and media, and engaged in violence to maintain order and loyalty. Further, because Chinatown existed as independent form the rest of New York City, with “an unstated policy of non-intervention by U.S. government officials, the informal structure [of the CCBA and ruling elite] maintain[ed] order in the community (93). This structure was even bowed to and acknowledged by federal authorities, who would consult with them as representatives of the community.

The government ignored the community, however, only until it felt threatened by it. In the 1950s, when America feared the spread of Communism, the government actively investigated and rounded up Chinese suspected of being Communists. This phenomenon relates to our class discussions about the treatment of minorities in the U.S. and how they are largely ignored and accepted only when they are silent and not too different. Kwong explains that the relationship of ignoring this minority was mutually fueled: The Chinese were not interested in voting for United States elections and so, in turn, the politicians did not campaign there. So Chinatown remained a place that was, for the most part, untouched by America and seemingly authentically Chinese.

Some individuals broke that pattern, though. S.B. Woo, for example, ran for Delaware office in 1984, and encouraged the Chinese that if they are in America, they might as well “get involved in” America and build a future there, effectively acknowledging the path of immigrant life that acknowledges a new homeland, and assimilates to an extent. Eddie Chan is another example; he followed that path and emerged acheiving the American dream, moving from Chinese immigrant to absorbing an identity of successful Chinese-American. Yet, when Chan was accused of Chinatown organized crime, he “avoided talking to the American press, but he did grant interviews to local Chinese reporters,” which reflects the acknowledgement of a Chinatown identity as being extractable from the rest of the American sphere of life.

When the two spheres of life are kept separate, while it can offer opportunity to see Chinatown as an authentic place, it also ignores certain realities of Chinatown for the American public. When a movie was produced that actually reflected Chinatown more accurately, people complained that it “tarnished the image of the Chinese community” (122). The complainers encompassed Asian Americans as well and so we see that the desire to silence some aspects of a minority to retain a squeaky authentic version of it is maintained by both the outside, American community, and the inside, Asian community as well.