In these chapters Kwong exposes the corrupt world of Chinatown’s underground politics. While I understand that the necessity for villages in Imperial China to form their own coalitions for governance and protection, and why these immigrants would maintain these connections and transplant it to Chinatown in the form of fongs in order to attain job opportunities and a sense of community, I don’t understand is how it flourished. The immigrants’ lack of assimilation into American institutions ended up breeding a hierarchy of corrupt individuals. Although the “benefits” (forcing competition out of business, collective defense against hostile larger society) may appeal to immigrants, I don’t understand how these associations could force “port duty” fees, have the right to tax members, and enforce zoning regulations they created themselves. Where did these associations such as the CCBA gain their authority? Through fear and force no doubt; membership was not voluntary. I completely agree with Kwong that their rule was not only arbitrary and nondemocratic, but the elite were simply self-appointed. This reminded me of a more extreme version of the Italian Harlem’s domus—a hierarchy that only gained its legitimacy because the community allowed it to be self-imposed.
These associations and collective Chinese ‘political’ organizations grew to contradict their purpose; no longer protecting the community (they themselves were what members needed protection from), they became exploitative machines for the community to fear. Residents’ unwillingness to resort to American policies allowed Chinatown’s elite to exploit and control the working poor, even by censoring their contact with the outside American world by controlling newspapers. The CCBA even went as far as to sabotage opposing views, even the CHLA, a laundry union, so they could put up forefront of Chinese solidarity and control how the outside American world viewed Chinatown. Once again, although tongs offered networking benefits and protection, the only means of rapid social advancement they offered immigrants without education or skills was through criminal activity, breeding new generations of corruption, violence, and fear.
It was good that the credibility and legitimacy of these associations faded as members of the community became more informed and outspoken in regard to their rights. There is a huge downside, however, since this pushed associations to be more reliant on force and tongs to maintain their influence. Tongs can only grow more dangerous when disguised as political organizations, and individuals (such as Eddie Chan) were able to skyrocket their political prominence. Even if the CCBA is no longer a threat, tongs continue to extort protection money from 50% of Chinatown’s stores. Even Chinatown banks launder drug money. Kwong concludes by saying “government passivity forced the community to live in fear… and perpetuate an economic structure which violates customary standards.” While government involvement and the defeat of corruption sounds ideal, I think it might do more harm than good. Associations and tongs are unfortunately so ingrained in Chinatown’s political and economic system that they’d be impossible to purge. While police can certainly “clean up the streets” and the more top level problems, overthrowing these associations and tongs can only cause a backlash and strengthening of these groups, which would in turn only lead to more aggressive force and community fear.
