I didn’t even know Mayor Bloomberg’s first name. To me, it was simply Mayor, that was his title, but more importantly, that’s what I saw him as. I also said it with pride. A lot of politicians say they will enact change, but like doubting Thomas, if I don’t see it, I don’t believe it (in politics, at least.) But I was a kid growing up in New York wanting to see the world grow up with me, too. I didn’t pay a lot of attention to naysayers or anyone against him; I was very one-sided. Learning about Moses and Jacobs helped put into perspective where a lot of people fall on the spectrum from who tries to serve the 99% and who serves the 1%. Seeing the numerous parallels between Moses and Bloomberg gave me the preconceived notion that he fell closer to the elites. But when I read that he hired “Amanda Burden, the socialite and civic-activist-turned-planner” as city commissioner, I realized that I had to second guess my judgement (Larson, 133).
I want to look ahead, just as any good planner does, and see if I can determine if New York was a successful city under Bloomberg’s administration. I know I have not learned the rest of the course material to do so, but I have enlisted David Leonhardt’s help from the NYT. He wrote an article entitled “A History of Bloomberg’s Successes and Failures” and I’m interested to see how he, an Op-Ed columnist who focuses on analytics, measures what is considered successful and compare it to what we will learn in future classes. Is a city successful because it helps the greater good as we often debate defining in class, or is it successful because it supports the elite who support projects that New Yorkers use?
Before I proceed to do so, Larson argues that Bloomberg’s administration built like Moses with Jacobs in mind, and I want to map out things Bloomberg did that was pro-Jacobs and what was pro-Moses.
Pro-Jacobs
– Hired Jacob’s mentor, William “Holly” Whyte, to help with city planning (Larson, 137)
– Hired Amanda Burden, a lover of Jacobs (Larson, 133)
– Revitalized the High Line instead of building in its place
– Made parks more accessible to a larger number of people
– Implemented the Calorie Rule to make citizens more aware (Leonhardt)
– Rewrote archaic zoning laws
– Regulated smoking (environmental and health awareness)
Pro-Moses
– Gave himself an extra term in office (from 2 to 3)
– Restructured the offices to fit his liking by getting rid of most offices in City Hall for open cubicles (Leonhardt)
– Inequality between the rich and poor wasn’t a main concern
– Was a Billionaire and depended on his personal wealth for support from voters and elite
– Schooling reforms were unpopular, not well thought-out and not pursued with conviction
To put the above information into perspective, Bloomberg had Moses’ motivation, but only for what he really wanted. While that may cause people to roll their eyes, Leonhardt argues that “While Bloomberg didn’t solve the great stagnation of living standards that afflicts the American middle class and poor, it’s hard to think of a contemporary mayor or governor who made more progress.” Does this mean that he was simply the best of the worst – and who judges what the “worst” is? Different mayors have different goals when they get elected into office. Our current one, Bill de Blasio, focuses more on what Leonhardt is saying is lacking. However, all that time and energy is going into building discussion, but not actually building. “The problem of inequality may well be too big for only a technocratic approach to government. It will probably also require muscular federal action on areas like taxes, antitrust, and workers’ bargaining power.” Here he begs the question of who do we blame for inequality – should it be the mayor’s priority, or does there need to be a major overhaul on the current political structure, starting from the central government?
Michael Bloomberg ran New York on data and analysis, in fact, that’s how he once became New York’s richest man. He figured out a way to give stock market traders better information about the bond market, believing that more numbers and facts would help them make more informed decisions (Leonhardt). Traders would pay heftily in return. Bloomberg learned that this tactic not only benefitted him, but the traders. There was extreme value in using facts and data. That is how he chose to ran NYC, and to Leonhardt, that’s what made most of his policies and decisions successful. He tried to “’build a culture of evidence’” (Leonhardt).
Chris McNickle, author of BLOOMBERG A Billionaire’s Ambition, stated “He succeeded in large part because of his faith in the power of facts. He sought detailed, reliable information about life in the city. He asked his aides to focus on big questions and charged them with improving New Yorkers’ lives.”
What I believe made Bloomberg a successful mayor, and New York a successful city under his rule, was that he was aware of his biases and flaws. He could’ve done what Trump did and choose nepotism (i.e. loyal supporters) to smooth out speed bumps in his mayoral road, but instead he purposefully enlisted those who offered another side and another voice. Michael Bloomberg was probably born a Robert Moses, but through experience he learned to become more like Jacobs. And that’s what makes any person truly successful: When they can analyze themselves and change.
References:
Larson, Scott (2013) “Building Like Moses with Jacobs in Mind:” Contemporary Planning in New York City. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Leonhardt, David (2017) “A History of Bloomberg’s Successes and Failures.” NYT.
McNickle, Chris (2017) BLOOMBERG A Billionaire’s Ambition. Skyhorse.
