Gentrification and Displacement

When googling “gentrification and displacement” the first article to show up cites studies which demonstrate the complicated link between gentrification and displacement.  These include studies that show that income gains do not significantly predict household exit rates, that only 6 to 10 percent of moves in New York City is due to displacement, that poverty levels can decrease dramatically without gentrification, and that gentrification can lead to higher racial, income, and educational diversity.  It also includes studies that demonstrate that 23% of residents in 5 major cities were displaced due to eviction, rent increases, or the selling of the house they rented, and that the poorest people in gentrifying neighborhoods are stuck there because moving is too costly (Florida). This article might seem somewhat biased due to the larger amount of cited studies that mitigate the negative aspects of gentrification, and I would argue that this is true since the author of this article is Richard Florida, who is an urbanist who gets paid by cities to turn their land into hubs for the creative class, which inherently gentrifies these cities.

To this article’s credit, the relationship between gentrification and displacement is scholastically and socially complex, detailed, controversial, and contradictory.  For example, a study of Boston from the 1980s to the 1990s found that in the time period of study, residents reported an increase in housing, neighborhood, or public service quality, while about one third of households were worse-off.  The study could not definitively say, however, that these results were from gentrification or from any other possible scenario such as a group of people falling on hard economic times; to subtract the effect of gentrification from the numbers is practically impossible (Vigdor 171).

However, as stated by Newman, underestimating displacement can hurt the poor, causing them to lose social capital and known policy-makers, and causing them to join a veracious housing market.  Newman estimates that the displacement rate in New York City is between 6.6 and 9.9 percent, and could be significantly higher since people who moved out of New York City or who became homeless or sheltered do not count into that estimate (Neman 51).

Even though displacement might or might not be contextualized in the numbers, they can be in the lives of people.  When Greenpoint was rezoned, the city allowed $2 million to mitigate displacement effects. However, the information and affordable housing sign ups given to the poor Polish immigrants whose lives there were given 3 years after rezoning and only lasted for 2 years.  Because of this, there were effectively were no barriers to displacement. Rents increased and low-income, working-class, Polish immigrants were displaced. Those who were not displaced, had displacement and gentrification forces applied to them. For example, since landlords wanted richer renters, they would employ scare tactics and artificially raise their rents to move the poorer residents out (Stabrowski 794, 795, 803, 810).  One thing that most studies agree on is that policies should move toward mitigating gentrification. If Greenpoint was not rezoned, or if a better mitigating policy was in effect, then this gentrification might not have happened. Policy change and implementation can be a good way to fight off gentrification, however, further studies into policies’ effects and practicalities should be studied to increase the likelihood of success.

The Complicated Link Between Gentrification and Displacement

New-Build Gentrification and the Everyday Displacement of Polish Immigrant Tenants in Greenpoint, Brooklyn

Does Gentrification Harm the Poor?

The Right to Stay Put, Revisited: Gentrification and Resistance to Displacement in New York City