The Sino-Indian Border War of 1962 was a major event in the geo-politics of South Asia yet it has not been adequately explored by contemporary research in the field. The significance of the Sino-Indian border war is often overlooked, mostly because of its overlap with the Cuban Missile Crisis, but this three week war has much to offer in showing the transition new born nations of the 20th century made from colonialism into the Cold War. Therefore, I propose the border war was a significant milestone in the development of the Cold War in Asia because the subsequent years after the war marked the militarization of the India-China border in the northwest (Aksai Chin & Kashmir and Jammu) as well as the northeast (Tibet & Assam frontiers).
Before I can illustrate the expansion of the Cold War in Asia after the Sino-Indian Border War, the pre-war international relations and diplomatic conditions in South Asia must be ascertained. This section, which will comprise the first half of the paper, will endeavor to determine whether the border war can be categorized as a proxy war. To do so, I will rely on Maxwell Neville’s India’s China War and Mohammad Ali’s Cold War in the High Himalayas accompanied by primary sources such as treaties, agreements and personal correspondences between key figures i.e. Nehru, Prime Minister of India. I will also utilize journal articles to highlight strengths and weaknesses of the above sources.
Maxwell Neville writes about conflicting history of the border and detailed accounts of army movements and maneuvers. While his work is possibly the most comprehensive and seminal text about the border war, it suffers from age as it was published 40 years ago and cannot consider the documents that became available after the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, Mohammed Ali’s more recent work sheds light on the covert operations that state actors (India, China, Pakistan, and United States) engaged in to thwart their enemies. However, Ali only uses Indian and American sources so his analysis is also limited in scope. Despite not being able to use Chinese documents, which are not available to the public, Ali’s book begs the question what was the Soviet Union’s role as this conflict unfolded? He only mentions the USSR in passing.
The second half of the paper will emphasize the immediate and subsequent consequences of the border war in relation of the Cold War and Sino-Indian relations. I intend to examine the impact of the war within the stretch of one decade after the war. I chose to fence this paper until 1972 because I suspect that year is another major milestone in the development of the Asian Cold War. Nixon’s visit to China changed the power dynamics and state alliances toward a new direction, and so it is beyond the scope of my study. I will continue to use Ali to discuss the post-war militarization of the border. Other books such as Lorenz Luthi’s Sino-Soviet Split, Chen Jian’s Mao’s China and the Cold War, and anthology called The India-China Relationship edited by Frankel and Hardings will be used as supplements to connect the overarching events and state policies directly to the burgeoning conditions after the border war. As before, I will insert pertinent information from primary sources and journal articles whenever possible.
Ultimately, the purpose of this project is to generate greater understanding and interest about the Sino-Indian Border War. Even prior to the border conflict, the Cold War in Asia was ubiquitous. I do not suggest the 1962 war triggered the Asian Cold War; however, it nonetheless propagated the phenomenon by pulling India and China into overt alliances and militarization. Therefore, the 1962 war was a moment of restive possibilities and a point of departure for a new phase of the Cold War. This new face of the Asian Cold War presented an intensification, militarization and greater superpower involvement in the ideological and strategic confrontations in the Subcontinent by India and China.
