Comment on Norton's "Essentialism and Queer History"

In this week's readings, both Jeffrey Weeks and Rictor Norton make compelling arguments about the nature of human sexuality, with Weeks claiming that it is entirely a social construction and Norton rejecting this idea by adopting an "essentialist" approach. The question of who is right is certainly not one that I am qualified, at this time, to answer, although my guess would be that, to some extent, they both are. For now, however, I would just like to address a particular claim made by Norton that, if I am reading him correctly, I found somewhat ridiculous and even quite offensive.

Norton very clearly states his view that while there does not exist "a single monolithic homosexuality," there are "only a very limited number of homosexual paradigms [that have] been observed," and that to claim otherwise is a "political statement rather than an observable fact." (p. 14) 

I find so many things wrong with this.

To start, how can we possibly rely solely on what has been "observed" as a means of providing information about a topic that has, to such a large extent, been silenced? As John D. Wrathall discusses in "Reading Silences Around Sexuality," so much has been censored historically in the realm of sexuality, homosexuality in particular, that it is nearly impossible to draw definitive, all-encompassing conclusions about it. 

By no means do I deny the existence of certain "homosexual paradigms" that can be observed throughout history. There are clearly certain models, socially constructed or not, that many homosexuals reflect. Though all gay men may not be as over-the-top and flamboyant as the popular character Jack McFarland of television's "Will & Grace," I'm sure most of us know at least one or two gay men who do seem to fit that mold. And I'm sure we've all encountered the stereotypical crew-cutted, Home Depot credit card-carrying lesbian.

But it is only so easy to observe these "limited number of homosexual paradigms," which Norton estimates to number maybe less than a dozen or so, precisely because they are the stereotypical paradigms. What about the gay man who doesn't dress only in designer, walk a certain way, or talk at a certain pitch? What about the lesbian who has long hair and wears makeup and likes to wear skirts? Where do they fit in? Are they at all visible? Does Norton consider them in his twelve paradigms? I think that there must be a very, very significant number of homosexuals who have not been noticed simply because they don't fit the stereotypes. And because of the continued perpetuation of the stereotypes, and the often negative connotations attached to them, I think there are a lot of gay men and women who don't want to be noticed, not necessarily because of the taboos surrounding homosexuality, but simply because they don't at all relate to any of the ways that Norton thinks there are to be gay. Maybe they think they're not "qualified" to identity as gay simply because they do not represent the 'homosexual norm.'

By claiming that there are only about twelve different 'ways to be gay' (my phrase, not his), I think Norton pushes further into the closet people like my friend Marissa who is both extremely feminine and extremely gay, yet doesn't like to admit it because even when she does, people don't believe her; "You're too hot to be a lesbian" is a common (ridiculous) response to the revelation that she is gay. So if people like Marissa don't want to make themselves visible and assert their own particular gay identity - because doing so, according to Norton, would only be "a political statement" and not "an observable fact" - how can they possibly be "observed"? By making such claims, I think Norton does a grand disservice to the gay community. I'm sure he would probably say that his paradigms do include "masculine" gay men and "feminine" gay women, but the impression I was left with after reading his essay was that gays all belong to their own sort of separate species apart from the rest of the straight human race. Or they at least belong to as many as twelve of them.

Comments

Constructionists and Essentialists Unite

It seems naive that the constructionists and essentialists consider their histories of sexuality to be mutually exclusive.  Specifically in this week's readings, Weeks and Norton make certain broad claims that are difficult to accept.  Weeks argues that sexuality is a "fictional unity," something "that once did not exist."  And Norton, as Marcella points out, makes certain sweeping generalizations about homosexuality, i.e. that "the queer gaze is immediately recognizeable."

I would agree with Norton in that sexuality is organic (and Weeks does concede that "sex" may be "natural").  And I would agree with Weeks in that sex has been politicized and codified.  But I would not say that sexuality is a completely independent force free from social regulation and influence.  I would also not agree that sexuality is a "fictional unity," or something that society produces. 

Rather, sexuality falls somewhere in between the two.  It is natural and spontaneous and intrinsic to human (and animal) behavior.  But it is often shaped and directed by social and political codes.  Sexuality is not a fictional unity, but the terms we use to describe it are artificial.  We have created them in order to help us understand this amorphous concept.  We need this terms in order to manage the deployment of sexuality.

It would be more appropriate to support a hybrid theory--- of "constructionist essentialism"--- that is more inclusive and more accurate.