Truth and Sexuality
Truth and Sexuality
The central question of Weeks and Norton’s essays is: Is sexuality socially constructed? (This is similar to a topic we were discussing in class last week, the social construction of the “inner self”). “Essentialism” was used to describe the idea that Norton supported, that there is a “transhistorical core of desire” as Peiss put it (1). I found myself agreeing with many of the ideas that Weeks put forward, the reasoning behind the assumption that sexuality is socially constructed, especially the influence of sexology, which resulted in the scientia sexualis that Focault brings up. Yet ultimately I found Norton’s argument more compelling. Weeks says that “sexuality only exists through its social forms and social organization” yet as Norton points out, homosexuals exists long before they were categorized as such (6). Certainly, society has had more than its fair share of influence on sexuality, but this is why I find Peiss’ wording so appealing – I agree with Norton that there exists a “core” sexuality. While sexuality may be altered (perhaps corrupted? Or do example of society influencing sexuality in a positive way exist?) by societal influences this does not mean it was constructed by society.
I believe one of the central ways that society has corrupted the idea of sexuality is through the advent of labels for sexual orientation. Rather than simply desiring because you are human (assuming essentialism), you desire men because you are a woman or a gay man, you desire women because you are a man or a lesbian woman, and the list continues on for terms such as “bisexual”. Norton brings up the idea that there was a shift in the medieval period, when “the concept of bisexuality was discarded from the consciousness f society, [and] a polarity began to establish itself between the …homosexual …and …the heterosexual,” and points out that there were people certain of their homosexuality during this bisexual societal period just as there are people who are ambiguous about their sexuality today. These seems to reinforce the idea that sexual orientation is constructed, because it is not that people’s sexual desires have changed, it is their need to put a label on their sexual desires. These need goes back to Foucault’s idea of scientia sexualis, where the discourse about sexuality is becoming just as (if not more) pleasurable than sex itself. However, I think in terms of sexual orientation, the need to have a label came with the categorization of some sexual practices and desires as “abnormal” (which came out of the medicalization of sexuality). It would make sense to me that those who fell in this group of “abnormal” in terms of sexuality might actually strive to find a label so that they might be part of a community where they are accepted, and perhaps gain the strength to be re-categorized as normal and be socially accepted by all (strength in numbers). While that would certainly be a positive outcome of the grouping of so-called sexual deviants under different labels, as I said before, I think a negative consequence is the social construction of sexual orientation. As Norton says, queers have a culture of their own just as an ethnic group would, a culture derived from their sexuality. This, in turn, reinforces the modern idea that truth lies in sexuality, and even if there is a “core” sexuality, that doesn’t mean it holds the truth.
Tags: essentialism, homosexuality, scientia sexualis, sexual orientation, social constructivism, truth
February 21st, 2010 at 1:34 pm
HI Kaitlyn, there is a lot going on in this reflection on Weeks and Norton. If you haven’t already read Joe’s post on these same issues, do so and see what you think about his take on combining the 2 essays to some extent. It seems that there is a dialogue at work here. You might also think about what Foucault says about “reverse discourses” in which a group identified as such takes the definition applied to it and then uses that as a kind of identity politics. See pages 100-102on the rule of tactical polyvalence of discourses.
One thing to keep in mind in discussions about homosexuality is to distinguish it as a term of the 19th century that carried a particular meaning–as Foucault argues and, as you say, a division between normal and abnormal and the weight of truth of one’s inner self. For Foucault, this is distinguishable from sexual relations between 2 men or 2 women–those would be same-sex practices but would not be construed as narrowly defining in the way that scientia sexualis insists. So he agrees that same-sex practices existed over time but that they would not be understood in earlier times in the same way that scientia sexualis diagnoses. His next 2 volumes study the way meaning were applied to these practices in ancient Greece and Rome and how the advent of Christianity began to shape them differently too.
February 28th, 2010 at 8:48 pm
It’s ironic that I so casually and somewhat incorrectly used the term “homosexuality” (as opposed to same-sex practices) after I paid such close attention to the difference between the phrases “family planning” “birth control” and “prevention of unwanted pregnancies” in the context they were used (or not used) at the Museum of Sex. Perhaps it has to do with what I identify as – as a woman, the subtle difference between “birth control” and the other two terms were more apparent to me than distinguishing between terms “homosexuality” and “same-sex practices” since I am not homosexual/do not engage in same-sex practices. In any case, I’ll be certain to try to be more careful in my usage of these terms in future posts.