http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/science/a-price-tag-on-carbon-as-a-climate-rescue-plan.html?_r=1
I read this article out of curiosity about what the current political administrations approach to carbon emissions is specifically. It gave an interesting case study of a dairy farm that has reduced its carbon monoxide emissions along with a big picture depiction of carbon markets on national levels.
I got excited when I learned about the possibilities in agriculture and animal husbandry posed by the dairy farm remodeling. The farmer who owned it were given the incentive of funding for the overhaul of their farm’s energy supply and receive additional money annually for having this particular energy generator, through a California initiative. The manure from the cows is treated to extract the methane gas from it as fuel while the rest of the manure is dried and used as bedding for the cows. This seems like an excellent idea, especially as it means not only reducing carbon emissions and using alternative fuel, but it also saves the costs and fuel expenditure required for bringing in bedding for the cows (tons and tons of straw, by truck).
Though the article transitioned rather abruptly from the small picture to the bigger, it gave a comprehensive overview of the global carbon market environment. The main approach now is the “cap and trade” model, where governments set a “cap,” the maximum total amount of carbon emissions allowed per year, and divide this total amount into “shares” of one ton or carbon each. Energy companies either buy enough shares to cover their total emissions, or can invest in carbon-emission-reducing innovation — whichever they find more profitable.
This model poses two large problems. One is the reliance upon the goodwill of energy companies, which is mostly a problem in the EU. Governments relied on companies to provide their current emission levels so that there could be an estimate of where to cap emissions. Of course, companies grossly overestimated so that they would not feel any future strictions on their emission levels, which rise each year. It is a big mistake to put the reins into the hands of the “horses” who need to be reined in themselves. Energy companies are the last people to be trusted to promote cleaner energy and environmental preservation when they are the very entities who benefit from the quick profits generated by the degradation of the environment and an increase in resources used up.
The second problem is the difficulty of generating enough political impetus to raise carbon share prices high enough to incentivize a switch over to investing in carbon reducing innovations. Since energy companies have extremely powerful lobbies, prices per share have not been able to rise over the highest price of $11 in California. In the EU, shares are only $7 per share, after an effort to raise it from the previous $4. This unevenness of global prices also allows energy companies to in a sense seek the lowest bidder and go where their emissions would cost them the least. This disunited front on fighting emissions is also symptomatic of global politics.
On a global scale, there is no consensus on how to fight climate change, and some of the biggest culprits of pollution and carbon emissions, like China, are absent from even discussing the issue and committing seriously to fighting the problem.
Of course cap-and-trade does have the advantage of linking climate concerns to the economy. As soon as money is concerned, even those who are unconcerned about climate begin to feel its relevance. The most important thing now is that exigent climate concerns be openly acknowledged and discussed by governments and citizens alike. Even those who debate the validity of rising global temperatures must accept the disadvantages of pollution and environmental harm.
