In Chapter 7 of Public Housing that Worked: New York in the Twentieth Century, Nicholas Dagen Bloom describes the public housing projects built in New York City around the time of Robert Moses. These public housing projects were large and bland. Some of the buildings that were torn down to build them had been serving their communities well. The developments may have been more beneficial to the city if they had been designed to incorporate some of the existing structures for a more pleasing appearance.

Unfortunately, in order to cut costs for public housing, sacrifices must be made. In the case of the public housing projects during this time, the main sacrifice made by NYCHA was in the aesthetics of the buildings. Instead of making the buildings architecturally significant, they were all built as tall plain towers with the same bricks. I think the ideas that led to this trend made sense logically but I think the result was very unfortunate.

Another problem with the actions of NYCHA during this time was that they demolished many things that didn’t need to be demolished. In most slum areas, there were certain buildings that were in far better shape than others. NYCHA demolished these because they were not practical for the planned developments. NYCHA also demolished many businesses that were contributing to their communities in order to accomplish the goals for their developments. In some cases, stores were unnecessarily demolished simply to make life inconvenient for the people of the community so they would be more willing to leave. Although NYCHA was demolishing businesses, they did not provide much commercial space in their development because they didn’t want to compete with private enterprise. While this reasoning is logical, I think it was detrimental for the communities NYCHA built.

Perhaps NYCHA could have done a better job of building more pleasing buildings at lower costs if they had found ways to incorporate some of the older buildings into the projects instead of demolishing everything to rebuild. In some cases, renovation might have been a better option. I’m sure that in many of the cases, the only reason NYCHA determined that renovation wouldn’t have been worth it was because they couldn’t quantify the value of more aesthetically pleasing architecture.

I understand that there are certain constraints when building low income housing so I understand why the public housing projects were designed the way they were. The public housing projects that were built served their goals well. I do wonder, though, if it could have been possible to create better designs that would have benefitted New York City more than the ones that were built.

Bloom addresses the Robert Moses-led policy on slum clearance in the post war era in this excerpt from his book, Public Housing that Worked: New York in the Twentieth Century. Personally, I am disturbed by the phrase “slum-clearance.” Communities that have fallen into disrepair should not be condemned to be “cleared.” Perhaps a more constructive, democratic approach might have been to rejuvenate these communities: by renovating existing buildings, updating infrastructure such as roads, building and/or updating community spaces such as parks and libraries can all be ways to attract newer residents and businesses into the area.

The biggest problem I saw with these plans is the uninspired Tower-Block design. These projects were praised for the ability to achieve “high density” accommodation. It seems almost like an effort to take certain parts of the population and force them to occupy these specially designed structures that would have “low ground coverage.” Rejecting the idea that the existing community might have any value at all and preemptively making the decision to destroy everything to replace it with these tasteless structures would not fixed the neighborhoods – it would have killed them.

I found it odd that getting public-private partnerships to happen in the target areas was seen as such a monumental task. Personally, I fail to see why existing private properties in slums, at least the ones that were not in disrepair were not simply allowed to stay on where possible. Instead of trying to force new private interests to move into freshly cleared area that was previously considered a slum, perhaps allowing the private citizens of the community to make certain decisions and assume responsibility for some of the projects would have served the community better in the long run.

Without any ties to the old well-established communities, these neighborhoods would have faced a high risk of becoming rife with undesirable elements again. In this matter, I agree with Jane Jacobs: having a community of people who are well established in the neighborhood and are invested in the happenings is the most sure-fire way of preventing crime and other unfavorable elements. Bloom says that having uniform designs allowed for easier “long-term maintenance.” This may be true but I am not convinced that “maintenance” is what these communities needed. Building these super structures and then regularly “maintaining” them through government agencies does not achieve any greater value for the city. Instead, if these communities had been renovated and given the right incentives, they might have grown to not need any government maintenance or oversight at all.

I agree with Mr. Lewis Mumford, who is quoted by Bloom in his piece. These buildings appear to have been “designed by one mind…intended for people of one class, bred like bees to fill these honeycombs.” It is shocking to me that ideas of “economic design” and “long-term maintenance” would be the foremost considerations while dealing with in-need communities.

This article by Michael Kimmelman is about a St. Louis public-housing complex, Pruitt-Igoe, and a housing cooperative in Manhattan, Penn South. The two housing complexes were the same structurally, with brick and concrete high rises scattered across grassy plots, but while Penn South is thriving today, Pruitt-Igoe became known for its poverty, crime, and segregations and was demolished in 1972 after. The question this poses, and what the article explores is why the two housing complexes went completely different ways.

Pruitt-Igoe had problems from the beginning and it sounds like it was destined to be doomed. There was inadequate money set aside for maintenance, welfare rules that said abled-bodied men couldn’t stay with a women who received government aid, and night staff who kicked out fathers from the apartments. This just leads to poorly maintained buildings as well as separated families. This along with the segregated towns that led to a loss of jobs in the city just spells disaster. I think that if a place is built well and similar to other successful housing, if it is not taken care of, and the people in it are unable to support themselves, it will just have bad results. The economic factors are probably one of the largest in determining the success of a place.

Penn South had a stable income from the maintenance payments and retail units in commercial buildings the co-op owned. The residents invested in the buildings and made improvements, which means that they cared and were able to get jobs and support themselves and their families and also have enough to spend on improvements. Penn South was in a different situation from Pruitt-Igoe, so it is not surprise that there were different results. Because the structures were about the same for both, it seems like architecture isn’t as large of a role in the success of buildings as the residents and how much money they and the building has. Architecture may play a role in how successful housing complexes are, but I believe the comparison between the two show that social and economic factors play a larger role.

Some of the comments of the article talk about how the comparisons between Pruitt-Igoe and Penn South don’t really make sense, because as the article says, Penn South isn’t public housing but Pruitt-Igoe is. Penn South is made affordable to working class families, but isn’t public housing. I think that there are often stereotypes associated with public housing, such as it being dangerous, which just already makes it more likely to not thrive and be successful. In addition, Penn South is in an affluent, diverse neighborhood in New York, whereas Pruitt-Igoe wasn’t. Architecture might have been similar, but the surrounding areas were not.

It would be interesting to compare other public housing complexes that were similarly built and in the same situation as Pruitt-Igoe to see what has become of them to see what causes success and failure. It would also be interesting to look into what the city and other places are planning for the future of affordable housing. Given that most NROCs in New York are towers in the park, is this what the city is planning? Is there enough space to build more places like this? Or will land have to be taken to build more housing? There are so many questions to be asked about the future of housing in New York and it remains to be see what will be done and if it will all be successful.

This excerpt from Bloom’s book, Public Housing that Worked: New York in the Twentieth Century, speaks clearly to both the design flaws of Robert Moses’s superblock projects and to the impact it had on the surrounding neighborhood. Moses believed in clearing the slums, but what he constructed in their place was not pleasing to the eye, nor helpful to the community. His plans, and the plans of NYCHA, were narrowly focused on cost and efficiency rather than people or community.

One of the primary criticisms of public housing in the mid-twentieth century was its unimaginative and over replicated design. According to Bloom, towers were typically shaped in X’s, T’s, or Y’s, with no elaboration or articulation of wall surface. Many residents saw this as an eyesore. Even Robert Moses acknowledged that there was little deviation from the standard when overhauling slums and rising up towers for housing.   However, he also acknowledged that it was not easy to produce a more pleasing variety without additional expense. In fact, these buildings were often built according to minimum standards in order lower development cost. Consequently, many apartments were given a grade C and labeled as unattractive housing for the poor. Hence, the design issues concerning public housing had an impact beyond simple aesthetics because it also alluded to the lower quality of such housing.

In addition to quality, housing projects that targeted slums also had a negative impact on the lives of original residents and the community. When the government condemns property to rebuild public housing, existing residents have no choice but to move. As a result, many black and Puerto Rican families were displaced when the process of slum clearance began. Most were crowded into already substandard tenement housing in neighboring areas, causing their living situation to worsen. In addition, when construction begins, the area is flattened (no trees, no houses, etc.) so that it could be rebuilt. Meaning, the neighborhood is abandoned for two or three years as construction takes over. When the project is finally finished, it becomes difficult to draw people back in because the area is typically deserted. Moreover, the housing plans provided very little space for the inclusion of stores. In fact, with limited space and a new rent structure, small businesses were discouraged from opening stores in newly developed areas. This resulted in less diverse businesses, more secluded residents, and a lack of community within neighborhoods. With this in mind, it is easy to see why Robert Moses and NYCHA needed to expand their perspective beyond cost and efficiency to include the nature of people.

As Robert Moses and NYCHA found out, the transformation of slums is not simply achieved by resurrecting cost efficient middle-income housing. Instead, the approach should also include diversity in appearance, provision for all income levels, and creation of social hubs to foster community. Nonetheless, Moses’s approach to public housing serves as a foundation for what New York City would become by the late twentieth century.

Hunt’s analysis on the reasons of urban crime and social upheaval provide a tight, scientifically backed reasoning towards one of societies greatest challenges. Hunt examines the public housing developments spearheaded in Chicago beginning in the 1950s, specifically youth-adult ratios found in high rise buildings. Hunt specifies what it requires to have a safe, thriving community, and asserts why exactly high rises coupled with large amounts of youths undermines this fragile social balance.

Hunt criticizes the public housing authority’s policy of gearing the projects towards children and families. Many of housing units features multi-family setups such a 3, 4, and even 5 bedroom units. Unmarried singles were deterred from accessing the public housing projects facilities. As a result, statistically housing projects displayed a larger percent of youth to adults, relative to any of other parts of Chicago. While 27% was the general norm for individuals under the age of 19 in most of the city, projects averaged an astounding 61% in 1945. The projects touted  as “children cities” became a mess.

High rise structures compiled the many preexisting problems with the underlining structures found in public housing projects to create a socially disparate environments. One particular example which I found compelling was the problem with elevators. Elevators in public housing projects were often prone to break downs due to various reasons such as pure neglect and vandalism. With elevators not working, tenants often found themselves either stranded in their apartments or having to walk up multiple flights of stairs. This situation proved in many respects to make housing projects unlivable. It weakened the moral of tenants, and increased the misery and sense of unruliness that already pervaded the projects. The high rise would would soon be seen to have many more functional issues.

I found Hunt’s piece to be both informative and refreshing. Urban decay and the overall failures of the public housing project system is always an interesting topic, and I particularly found how such subtle issues brought down an entire way of life for many people. It is quite fascinating how simply the ratio of children relative to adults could destroy a multimillion government project, developed by some of the greatest urban planners of the time. Hunt’s interesting perspective on child-adult ratios and high rise structures, provides another interesting lens to examine the downfall of public housing in the 50s, 60s, and 70s

I also thought that Hunt’s theories related to children explains the failures of the projects. I kind of saw the situation as a form of “Lord of the Flies” syndrome. When children are in an environment with many other children and little adult supervision, they tend to get out of hand and misbehave in ways often not exhibited in children. This added factor I believe  is essential to Hunt’s thesis. Another potent factor was introduction of hard drugs to the projects such as pcp, heroin, and most famously crack and cocaine. Teenagers and young adults often became heavy users of these deteriorating drugs. I’m quite sure that poor adult supervision and guidance exacerbated the use of drugs in the projects