From Katz’s piece, it sees as though the term “underclass” went through a metamorphosis of meanings. From the 1970s to the 21^st century, it found associations with everything from negativity and pity to spirited hope amidst adverse conditions.

To begin, I found that a key part of defining or even mentioning the underclass in academia, newspapers, and other media stemmed from the allocation of funds through public policy.  Where public money is spent, there follows harsh criticism and a need for evaluation. It is almost as though an entire social science category was born out of the need to explain the question of poverty in regards to culture, environment, and the distribution of money (welfare). The result of integrating research and public policy is the polarization of perceptions because even amidst objective research, results are skewed by private agendas (whether conservative or liberal) to advocate a cause. The direct result of such polarization is likely the reason our “underclass” in the 21^st century carries a different meaning than the “underclass” forty years ago.

In the 1970s, the underclass was typically viewed as undeserving poor whose circumstance was a function of their own behavior. Researchers attempted to explain that social isolation, or lack of supervision and role models, bred a culture of poverty. In addition, the most common image of poverty was of an African American woman raising her children through the support of welfare. As much as anthropologist tried to remove the image and supplant it with an objective framework to judge the cause of poverty, private agendas continued to anchor perceptions. A prime example is the work of Oscar Lewis, who discussed the “culture of poverty” in hopes of stirring activists for his cause. He achieved no such feat and the term became a speaking point that advocated punitive public policy. Yet, we now live in a culture where the underclass is labeled as undeserving poor, but rather, as those lacking the right opportunity to escape their circumstance.

To continue, the emergence of new springboard projects that give those in poverty a means of overcoming is the product of a changing perception. Whether the tool is microfinance or government supported initiatives, people in adverse economic situations have proven their capacity to progress. With this in mind, true characterization of the poor can only be attributed after opportunity is granted. Hence, it is imperative that programs be in place because it is then that behavior truly becomes responsible for a person’s economic circumstance.

Neil Smith’s “Building the Frontier Myth” addresses how frontier ideology wildly distorts and rationalizes social differentiation. At first glance, the frontier myth appears playful, optimistic, and even idyllic. However, the underlying incongruences that stems from displacing historical and geographical quality is quite dangerous.

The media has a lot of pull in establishing what we know as the “frontier myth” because of their happy-go-lucky portrayal of urban pioneers. Movies became a source of  “fact,” and stories quickly stretched beyond their original context. Soon enough, history and even geography were distorted, reframed, and applied to different situations. The Old West frontier myth began to move east, where cities began its physical and demographic transformation. Whites ventured to new wilds (the City) where they infused middle class culture and ideals in places such as Ludlow and 42 Streets. Hence, the optimistic image of soaring real estate values that is commonly associated with the frontier myth ignores the exclusion that occurs below the surface.

With this in mind, Smith suggests that frontier ideology serves to tame the wild city and rationalize social differentiation. With the new urban frontier focused on nature and fads, there still remains an exaggeration of context (both historical and geographical) that classifies the ideology as “myth.” Smith believes such line of thinking displaces both class and race. People conform to social norms and those who refuse to follow are viewed as uncivil. Hence, in regards to social differentiation, classifying the poor and working class as “uncivil” is justified through the lens of frontier ideology because they cannot afford to conform. As a result, the happy-go-lucky image portrayed in movies, newspapers, and other sources of information is met with an image of exclusion and displacement that attempts to socialize an ideology.

Altogether, I found it interesting that Smith connected the frontier myth with the topic of gentrification (or social differentiation) because the connection is often overlooked. While his ideas are logically consistent and his criticism of the frontier myth seems justified, I question whether the resulting consequence was intended or simply a byproduct of urban pioneering.

Frank Braconi points out that New York’s in rem housing policy holds semblance to no other in the country. Beginning in the 1970s, the program was intended to be a temporary solution in light of disinvestment and abandonment. However, new tax policies and changes in demographics forced the City to continue standing in the gap. When disposition programs finally commenced, there was huge controversy over who should acquire the City’s large portfolio of abandoned buildings.

The origin of in rem housing lies directly in abandonment and disinvestment of buildings by working class whites. When these middle income families moved out of inner city neighborhoods into more appealing housing, they sparked the deterioration of buildings they left behind. With the wealthier families moving out, remaining residents were typically those who struggled to find jobs and pay the rent. Hence, buildings lost their best tenants and in the face of rising cost, could not afford proper maintenance. The city anticipated problems but only made them worse by altering the tax code. As a result, those who were delinquent in their payments for a single year were evicted, causing more abandonment. With the problem spiraling out of control, the City had no choice but to acquire the troubled buildings for the time being.

Although the program was intended to be temporary, problems persisted and the City found itself in the business of managing properties. Personally, I think the Housing Preservation Department was very efficient in their approach. They focused on consolidating housing and managed to increase occupancy from 40% to 85% while getting rid of 1900 buildings. In addition, they enacted rent regulation policies and cut costs by contracting maintenance jobs. Hence, while it was not their intention to manage housing, the City seemed surprisingly effective in handling them.

When the time came to dispose of the City’s huge housing portfolio, there was controversy over whether ownership should belong to tenants, nonprofits, or private parties. Tenant ownership seemed to foster low rent and anti-landlord rhetoric, both of which were bad for maintaining a building. The local nonprofit ownership appealed to many, but it proved to reveal no clear cost efficiencies. Nonprofits were found to set initial rents too low and as a result, struggled to make up their costs. The final and most controversial disposition program supported private ownership. Activists were outspoken against these parties, citing gentrification and the incompatibility of profit making and low-income housing. With such controversy circling disposition programs, it took until the Guiliani administration before the City could substantially deplete its in rem housing.

Hence, the longevity of New York’s in rem housing distinguishes it from any other city across the country. In the face of disinvestment and abandonment, the City managed to effectively consolidate housing and sap up tax revenue. Nonetheless, the program’s continuation (and even its end) stirred controversy and discontent from all groups, making it a burden to the City.

Before reading Miriam Greenberg’s, “Selling the City in Crisis,” I never acknowledged the impact reputational capital had on a City’s economy. From this chapter, Greenberg portrays the importance of public perception in shaping a city’s fiscal condition. With this in mind, civic organizations become a necessity in order to fight bad publicity and its related prospect of economic stagnation.

It seems as though New York’s reputation in the 1960s was a self-fulfilling prophecy because we entered into a cycle where bad publicity led to disinterest and deterrence. For instance, the media consistently portrayed New York as a graffiti tagged and crime infested area. This reputation discouraged both prospective investors seeking to start a business and residents who already lived there. In addition, publicizing and overemphasizing crime made it difficult for existing companies to attract talented employees. As a result, the city experienced a “Corporate Exodus,” where businesses with headquarters in the City found it more appealing to situate elsewhere. Furthermore, because of the corporate flight, the City lost revenue from business travelers, reducing hotel occupancy and tourism in general. The spiral continued downward as middle class residents moved out of the City and relocated in the suburbs where safety and sanitation were of less concern. Hence, it is easy for a City lambasted by negative media to enter into a cycle where negative attitudes become actualize.

Since Greenberg makes it clear that perception has the power to start an economic downturn, it becomes a necessity to keep the City’s image in check. Civic organizations such as ABNY (Association for a Better New York) need to exist regardless of their overall measurable benefit. ABNY was formed with the goal of promoting NYC as business friendly and lobbying for better regulations. Although its economic impact was wiped out by the fiscal crisis of 1975-1976, it still made strides in promoting a healthier image of the City. Strategies such as the Big Apple campaign, operation clean sweep, and operation interlock have survived for decades and restructured the way people perceive New York City. Though there is much to be debated about their involvement in housing and development, ABNY managed to bring news media, and even comedy hosts, to understand the importance of portraying a positive New York City.

Altogether, Greenberg makes the general point that public perception can dictate the economic conditions of a city. New York’s unsavory image during the 1960s turned away residents, tourists, and potential businesses. However, the formation of ABNY to promote economic health through perception and legislation made way for a future of attraction. Hence, it is necessary for civic groups to protect the perception of a City if we hope to escape the cycle that follows bad publicity.

This excerpt from Crabgrass Frontier discusses the government’s influence in dictating the housing Market. Kenneth T. Jackson explains how such influence has been a disadvantage to both ethnic groups and urban environments in the past. However, the major qualm should be directed at the adoption of discriminatory attitudes by the federal government, rather than the influential powers of the agency.

In the 20^th century, there was a general trend of moving to the suburbs that was evident with and without legislative incentive. Before 1933, purchasing a place to live was an individual choice not limited by many regulations. Nonetheless, as roads emerged, automobiles became popular, and gas remained relatively cheap, people were drawn to the suburbs. The suburbs seemed to represent American ideals of progress and privacy. However, after the Great Depression, government intervention resulted in policies created by the HOLC (Home Owners Loan Corporation) and the FHA (Federal Housing Administration) that bolstered the move into suburbia. When it became easier for families to buy a house in the suburbs than rent one in the city, most families seemed to fulfill their own private dream by choosing to own property. As a result, it can be said that the implementation of government policy only assisted people in following a trend that was already on their minds.

This being said, the argument against Washington should not be for deconcentrating the inner city or robbing it of the middle class, but rather, the manner in which they executed such change. As Jackson points out on page 217, “the lasting damage done by the national government was that it put its seal of approval on ethnic and racial discrimination.” In other words, it is outrageous that public policy adopted by HOLC was able to legitimately consider neighborhoods as “undesirable” or “declining” based on the presence of black families. Furthermore, the FHA adopted these systemized appraisal methods and rating systems, making it difficult for heterogeneous populations (such as cities) to look desirable in terms of projected property value. Hence, it became clear that certain people groups, namely blacks, would always be restricted to neighborhoods of lower value. This, in essence, is publicly enforced racism. If the influx of black families resulted in the devaluation of property, then there would be no circumstance in which blacks could socially progress. As a result, the criticism of Washington over controlling the housing market should be centered on the adoption of discriminatory legislation.

Altogether, Kenneth T. Jackson clearly portrays the monumental influence that government can have in dictating the housing market. However, this influence becomes unjust if it is dictated by policies that hold a negative attitude towards particular ethnic groups. Hence, the concern is not about the power of government to influence housing, but more about the manner by which they carry out such influence.