Here is the Plan

1. I will begin writing my interview questions, which will be sent out to various NGOs such as War Against Rape (WAR), women rights organizations such as Women’s Forum Action (WFA), political parties such as Jama’at-i-Islami, ulemas, and authors whose work I have read. My interviews will include questions about the justification used for restrictive rape laws, why such laws are targeting towards women etc. Although one can argue that I can get that sort of information by research alone, I think interviewing will narrow down my sources. Since most of my questions will be open-ended, I will be organizing this information in the form of separate journal entries. Later, I will put them in a visual for easier comparison.

2. I will also be reading the following books:

  • Women of Pakistan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back? by Khawar Mumtaz and Farida Shaheeda.
  • Purdah and the Status of Women in Islam by Maududi. His philosophy was influential in the incorporation of Hudood Laws in the penal code of Pakistan. That is why I think it is important to understand his views of women.

3. My research goals:

  • Find specific instances where misinterpretation of Islamic ideas has led to restrictive laws. This will be expanding on how Zia justified his martial law, how political parties continue to promote Maududi’s ideologies, how local jirgas exploit power to carry out discriminatory verdicts.
  • Explore the clash of different legal systems (Sharia vs. secular law) and its implication for victims of rape.
  • Research the theme of how Islamic virtues are intertwined with traditional values like purdah. This will shed light on how Hinduism and Mughal’s rule has shaped accepted cultural values.

I have not set exact deadlines yet because I will be doing most of the tasks simultaneously. I will also be reading journal articles and watching documentaries to gather further information.

Research Journal: Differences in Women’s Perspective on Legal Rights

Mumtaz, K. (1994). Identity Politics and Women: “Fundamentalism” and Women in Pakistan. In V. Moghadam (Ed.), Identity politics and women: Cultural reassertions and feminisms in international perspective (pp. 228-242). Boulder: Westview Press.

Resistance to government’s Islamization program has not been a unified struggle for all women in Pakistan. A sharp divide exists between women who Mumtaz calls “fundamentalists” and women’s right activists. The difference in their perspectives arises from factors such as class differences and exposure to type of education (Western education or Islamic education). Although the concerns of the two groups are the same: they call for a ban on polygamy, demand fair divorce procedures, etc., the bifurcation in their ideas emerge regarding the concept of gender equality, women’s role, legal rights etc.

Women’s Action Forum (WAF), which was created in response to Zia’s Islamization program, has been at the forefront questioning patriarchal structures and the use of misinterpreted Islam to justify restrictive legal laws. While women’s rights activists challenge strictly defined gender roles and the notion of women being nurturers and reproducers of society, “fundamentalist” women embrace these ideas. They opt for complete gender segregation. So which organizations or political party are “fundamentalist” women affiliated with? Mumtaz identifies that most “fundamentalist” women are either supported by Jama’at-i-Islami or they belong to its student wing called Jama’at-i-Talebat. Also, the party has a strong influence in urban areas that have gone through industrialization. Other religious-based political parties include Jamiat-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba, but none of these parties have a women’s wing or women members in their higher ranks.

Before picking this book, I had incorrectly assumed that most women in Pakistan would consider the Hudood Laws to be restrictive and downright discriminatory towards women. However, “fundamentalist” women do not think that way. They argue that women should not interact with men and therefore should not pursue careers in politics, but these “fundamentalist” women –although small in percentage when compared to the party’s total members – hold positions in their party and parliament themselves.

Research Journal: Ideological-Political Positions of Muslims in Indian Subcontinent

Weiss, A. (1986). The Historical Debate on Islam and the State in South Asia. In Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan (21). New York: Syracuse University Press.
 

Ideological_Political Positions Before Independce in 1947

Research Journal: The Historical Debate on Islam and the State in South Asia

Weiss, A. (1986). The Historical Debate on Islam and the State in South Asia. In Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan (21). New York: Syracuse University Press.

Even though Pakistan is a confessional state in the sense that its creation was due to religion, the three main leaders of the Muslim nationalist movement –Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Mohammad Iqbal, Mohammad Ali Jinnah – were secularitist, who wanted a secular state with a Muslim majority. They did not want to establish a theocratic state based on Islamic laws. As a matter of fact, in his inaugural address as Pakistan’s first president, Jinnah stated, “in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.” Clearly, he envisioned a country where everyone would have equal rights, despite their religion. So why, despite the fact that ulema (religious leaders) did not organize the independence movement, has Islamic law influenced the legal system in Pakistan so profoundly? In order to understand the role of Islam in judicial reforms and policies, I have to grasp a basic background on early political parties that played a role in creating/ shaping the constitution and then understand their stance on Islamic laws.

In the late 1800s, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan organized a socio-educational movement, urging Muslims to participate in social and educational institutions to gain representation. He believed that Muslims would only achieve emancipation if they were willing to advance in modern education. In 1877, he founded the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental (MAO) College at Aligarh, where scientific and western philosophy was emphasized. In 1906, Agha Khan led a group of Aligarh-educated Muslims (future Muslim League, a political party) to demand separate representation in the government and three years later they were successful in most provinces. Followers of the Aligarh movement are identified as modernist as they draw a distinct line between religion and politics.

The antithesis of Aligarh movement was Deoband School, founded by Muhammad Qasim Nanawtawi in the mid-1800s. This religious institution’s philosophy stressed Islamic traditional sciences and totally cut off Western education. It is important to note that the Deobandis were opposed to modernist’s two-nations theory, i.e., Hindus and Muslims were essentially two different nations with distinct cultures, histories, and customs. Deobandis did not believe in a separate state.

In 1919, some ulema affiliated with the Deoband School founded another religious-political movement called the Jamiat-i-ulema-i-Hind. This group opposed British rule and were also against a separate state. Later, it split into Jamiat-i-ulema-i-Hind and Jamiat-i-ulema-i-Islam, which supported Pakistan.

In 1941, as a direct response to the Lahore Resolution, Maulana Maududi formed a political party called the Jama’at-i-Islami. In conjunction with eight other political parties, a collective group known as Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) firmly demanded that Islamic laws be included in the legal system. In 1977, when General Zia-ul-Haq Chief Martial Law Administrator PNA applauded his military intervention for members of PNA became cabinet members without elections. The irony of General Zia’s martial law is that it was not a legitimate move in democratic or Islamic sense. In secular view, he took over the state without any elections; in religious view, he did not come to power with the consent of the people or their leaders.