In retrospect it is somewhat easy to understand China’s dismal opinions toward foreigners and how it has manifested itself in the limitations of religious practices pre 1949. By studying the change and continuity of Chinese policies and observing China’s response toward current global sociopolitical issues, we can speculate that the dismissal of foreign ideas has had its history rooted prior to the religious atrophy and may have began at the start of Western imperialism. However, it is still shocking that the censorship and repression of foreign influence has advanced into technological affairs. In fact just yesterday the Chinese officials announced the creation of the State Internet Information Office, which will supervise internet content including tweets on twitter and statuses on facebook.
The introduction to chapter 4 discusses China’s wariness towards the Church and its potential for resistance and rebellion (86). Despite the resurgence of nationalism and the expulsion of all foreigners including missionaries, China’s religious situation has yet to be fully amended, as there exists discord between the Catholics and the Protestants (even within the strands of Protestantism). The following chapters examine the religious reorganization of Christian groups, putting more emphasis on Protestants.
Catholics in post-1949 Fuzhou were plagued with serious structural and religious problems. Chinese Catholics were forced to renounce allegiance to the pope and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association was to assume all responsibilities, i.e., the appointment of bishops. Catholics who refused to conform were imprisoned and considered to have allegiances outside China.
For Protestants in most of China, the reorganization imposed by the Chinese government demanded a merger of all Protestants under the TSPM (Three-Self Patriotic Movement) banner. This was difficult as there were close to one million Protestants in China, which were related to twenty-three major denominational groups, representing both indigenous factions and foreign mission boards. However, religious policies were not enforced evenly and churches in Fuzhou never merged—the launch of the Cultural Revolution eventually closed these churches by 1966. Even under the TSPM banner, many of the smaller denominations resisted even limited cooperation (91). For instance, a strand of Chinese Protestantism, the Home of Grace, has regularly conflicted with what the state considered orthodox practices. Since they refused to participate in the TSPM, the Home Of Grace was charged as counterrevolutionaries and were stopped during the 1950s (95). As Christianity grew, the government was soon unable to manage and monitor the churches. In the late 1980s and up until the early 1990s, the state implemented a series of policies, which required the approval of all religious organizations.
A bulk of the reading focuses on narratives, which elaborates on several ideas that were brought up. The story of Mrs. He for instance, reinforces the severity of Chinese regulation (Mrs. He died in prison and her student, Sister Jiang, was incarcerated in 1975 for similar charges, such as unauthorized religious practices).
The chapter itself raises several concerns on the role of religion in China. While Christianity continues to grow and spread, much of it is differs from the orthodox expressions of Christianity supported by the government. With this, Guest ends his chapter with the following question: What role will these Christians play in the future development of dynamic Chinese social and political situations?
