Oct
06

On The Adaptive Value of a Set of Related Religious Behaviors

Filed Under (HTC10-11) by on 06-10-2010

All phenotypic traits ubiquitous to a given species are considered to necessarily have evolved as adaptations in response to the environments in which they arose. A phenotypic trait introduced into a population, by virtue of what is proven by evolutionary theory, necessarily experiences selective pressures. In response to environmental factors, any novel trait in a given organism translates into one of three options for the organism’s reproductive success. It either increases decreases, or leaves it unchanged.

In the case that a trait results in a statistical decrease in offspring, it will over-time be removed from a population as generations go by and fewer and fewer individuals possess the trait. In the case that it leaves an organism’s number of offspring unchanged in relation to the rest of the population, the percentage of organisms displaying this characteristic in a population will remain static until in much likelihood it is removed or replaced in absence of selective pressure to keep it in place. Finally, in the case that a trait is introduced into a population and results in a statistical increase in viable offspring for those individuals possessing the trait, the percentage of organisms with that trait within a given population will increase over time until a point is reached (if it is reached) where it is no longer advantageous to the organism. Thus, it is possible to conclude that any trait observed as omnipresent within a species necessarily must have experienced positive selective pressure in response to the environment in which it evolved—the difficult and interesting part is to identify the details of such a mechanism as pertaining to the evolution of a specific trait.

To extend this discussion to humans, it is necessary to consider that the modern human phenotype has remained relatively unchanged for tens of thousands of years, which should not be surprising given that significant evolutionary changes typically occur over far larger time intervals. Thus any discussion of the evolutionary origins of an exclusively human phenotypic trait must consider the environment in which the trait arose and consequently how the trait presents a novel response to environmental conditions to the effect of the trait’s subsequent presence in a greater and greater proportion of the population.

One such ubiquitous trait of the human species—indeed it is considered a defining one—is the phenomenon of religious behavior. Yet my use of trait in the preceding sentence is misleading, as there is no reason to suggest that in the evolutionary sense, religion is a trait at all, but rather more appropriately it is the end-product of a variety of traits. However once more, this is not to say that certain elements of the larger phenomenon of religion cannot be identified as individual traits and analyzed with respect to their evolutionary environment and the advantage which they conferred or perhaps continue to confer.

Perhaps the most fundamental element of human religiosity is the attribution of morality to an external and necessarily unfalsifiable (supernatural) source, along with a compulsion to publicly acknowledge this source through various ritualistic activities. Additionally, there is the expectation (and indeed a demand) that other members of one’s population participate in these rituals or perform their own. Further, while it is possible that these are multiple traits (as addressed earlier), I argue that they are integrally connected and react synergistically in several ways.

I contend that religious rituals are a means by which individuals confirm for other members of their population their attribution of morality to the same unfalsifiable source as everyone else. In this fashion, this instance of religious behavior is presented as an adaptation evolved in response to an environment that promoted cooperation among members of the greater population, beyond the familial cooperation that had been in place for millions of years in ancestral organisms.

In this view, attribution of morality to an external source, which necessarily requires unfalsifiability (lest it be proven false), and a subsequent acknowledgement of this attribution through ritualistic behavior is a means by which a population of humans was able to discern who among them possessed the appropriate moral principles to allow for altruistic behavior toward individuals who experience no direct personal gain by reciprocating.

Morality, in this sense, is defined as the function by which humans are able to judge the general permissiveness of various actions. In essence, morality is synonymous with an internal sense of fairness ingrained into the cognitive mechanisms of the human brain, and there is a great selection of evidence confirming the validity of this definition.

On the other hand, morality is a relatively recent addition to the human brain, in comparison to more primal survival instincts which generally act to inhibit an individual from sacrificing personal resources for the sake of unrelated others. Likewise, it can be a weak reinforcement of the need to reciprocate generous actions. This is where the discussed religious traits come in. By attributing morality to an external and unfalsifiable source, individuals confirm its existence and are forced to consciously confront it. By demanding that others participate in ritualistic behavior that acknowledges his source of morality, one is able to confirm that he isn’t alone in feeling a compulsion to behave altruistically. This affects the frequency of religious phenotypes in that irreligious individuals are systematically eliminated from a population until an overwhelming frequency of religious individuals dominates the gene pool.

These conclusions are drawn in response to an overwhelming degree of evidence from evolutionary science, cognitive psychology, anthropology, and ecology that seem to suggest that the preceding is a reasonable proposal pertaining to the evolution of specific religious behaviors in the species Homo sapiens. While it is generally impossible to prove such a theory definitively, I believe that in consideration of the latest in published science, this proposal is both scientifically and intuitively sound.

As a conclusion, I feel I must mention some key points about this intended thesis. While several of the details of this proposal are subject to change upon the discovery of additional evidence, it does hinge on several things that I believe provide for a solid foundation for the greater argument. To the best of my knowledge, these mentioned religious traits are a universal characteristic of the human species; morality as discussed above is indeed defined accurately; religious rituals have been demonstratively shown to increase cooperation and fitness of populations; and the evolutionary theories of group and individual selection converge to organize all of these elements into a coherent mechanism of selection. Additionally, I have conspicuously omitted statements regarding the specific cognitive processes that define the afore-mentioned religious behavior. It has been theorized that the attribution of morality to a supernatural source, for example, is a by-product of a cognitive process having no direct relation to the establishment of cooperation. While this may indeed be so, this does not counter the assertion that once-present, this moral attribution had an adaptive effect as described earlier. In any case, to conclude, I reiterate that this proposal aims to ultimately be no more than a likely scenario, given the available evidence, and I do not expect that concrete answers to evolutionary questions as complex as this will be available any time soon.



One Response to “On The Adaptive Value of a Set of Related Religious Behaviors”

  1.   Lee Quinby Says:

    Igor,

    Your Proposal needs to propose more by saying more specifically which theoretical approaches your will survey and how you will organize the argument of your honors thesis to make your case. Here you have begun the argument, so to speak, rather than saying what you argue, what data you will use, and how your argument will unfold. At this point, because I have read your position paper, you don’t need to to rewrite the Proposal, but I do want you to know the conventions of Proposal-writing. We will work on this in class in terms of the abstract you will prepare for NCUR.

    In terms of content so far, I have questions about the concept of trait as used here. You concede that religion per se is not a trait, but seem to hang onto morality as one, even though you acknowledge that some (who?) have argued that religion is “an adaptation evolved in response to an environment that promoted cooperation among members of the greater population, beyond the familial cooperation that had been in place for millions of years in ancestral organisms” while others (again, cite sources/authors) have argued “that the attribution of morality to a supernatural source, for example, is a by-product of a cognitive process having no direct relation to the establishment of cooperation.” This points to the kind of debate that you will analyze and evaluate, but what I am concerned about at this stage is whether morality is being seen as a trait rather than a result of several traits that aided survival. So work on clarifying that for your readers.

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